U.S. Weapons Systems Riddled With Fake Chinese Parts

An investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee has identified roughly 1,800 instances of counterfeit electronics entering the Pentagon’s supply chain, with the total number of bogus components exceeding 1 million. 

A backgrounder from Committee Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain says that “counterfeit or suspect counterfeit electronic parts have been installed or delivered to the military for use on thermal weapons sights, on THAAD missile mission computers, and on military aircraft, including the C-17, C-130J, C-27J, P-8A Poseidon, AH-64, SH-60B, and CH-46.”

Officials from Raytheon (RTN), L-3 Communications (LLL), and Boeing (BA) are on Capitol Hill today, to testify at a hearing which will “explore sources of counterfeit electronic parts and how they are made, cases where counterfeit electronic parts have penetrated the defense supply chain, and the cost and potential impact of counterfeit electronic parts on defense systems.”

So, what are the sources, how are they made, and how have they penetrated the defense supply chain?

In this case, “well over 100” counterfeit parts were traced backward through the supply chain, with more than 70% coming from China and roughly 20% of the remaining parts leading to the UK and Canada -- both described in the Levin-McCain report as “known resale points for counterfeit electronic parts from China.”

But, as Larry Loucka -- a Certified Supply Chain Professional and Lean Sigma Master Black Belt who has worked with companies such as Honeywell (HON) and Toyota (TM), as well as Raytheon, L-3, and the US Air Force -- tells me, today’s electronics don’t really come from anywhere else.

“I don’t imagine we’re talking about nuclear triggers here,” Loucka says. “And we just don’t make basic electronic components in the US anymore.”

The parts involved included counterfeit transistors found in night vision systems used aboard the Navy's SH-60B helicopter and counterfeit memory chips installed in cockpit video display units on eight Air Force C-27J transport planes, which could provide pilots with incorrect information. And while they aren't nuclear triggers, Sen. McCain warns that unreliable bogus components could lead to “a ballistic missile interceptor failing to hit its target, [or] a helicopter pilot unable to fire his missiles.”

According to Loucka, who has extensive experience in sourcing equipment from China, counterfeit parts can enter the military supply chain as easily as they can slip into those of any other industry.

“Why should military parts be any different than auto parts, consumer electronics, anything, really,” he says. “They look right, they’re the right size, the right dimensions, they have the correct certificate, how would you know? It’s a global market and parts are parts.”

Loucka explains that “changing military specs or sourcing rules literally requires an act of Congress,” though certain systems require parts that are no longer manufactured by their original suppliers -- a situation detailed in the Armed Services Committee’s report: