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business newsTo Partner, or Not to Partner: Exploring the New Paradigm in Biotechnology Collaborations
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MD Becker Partners Mar 10, 2011 10:15 am
Traditional wisdom holds that biotechnology companies benefit from collaborations with their larger pharmaceutical peers. But the industry has changed.
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Editor's note: This article was originally published at Life Science Digest.
Traditional wisdom holds that biotechnology companies benefit from collaborations with their larger pharmaceutical peers, which can help validate a company’s technology, provide capital to help fund clinical development, and enable access to experienced clinical, regulatory and commercial infrastructure. While this was certainly true in the early days of biotechnology, the industry has now matured -- ushering in a new era whereby executives must carefully weigh the trade-offs between raising capital to go alone (equity dilution) and sharing economics with a partner (asset dilution). For a comparison between the old and new paradigms in biotechnology collaborations, refer to Table 1.
Table 1. Old Versus New Paradigm in Biotechnology Collaborations
In addition, the negative considerations from large pharmaceutical partnerships are often overlooked, which begs the question: Is it better to partner, or go alone? To help address the topic, this article focuses on the oncology segment of the life science industry -- one of the most popular therapeutic areas for partnering and merger & acquisition (M&A) activity.
Luck Versus Skill
Prior to addressing the question of whether or not a small biotechnology company should collaborate with a larger pharmaceutical organization, we solicited investor views regarding the process of corporate partnering. Some of the feedback indicates there is a lack of transparency.
“As an investor, partnering activity is the most opaque part of our companies’ business,” said David Sable, portfolio manager, Special Situations Life Sciences Fund. “Every small biotech CEO tries to create an image of limitless interest on the part of big pharma in each of the company’s projects, a dynamic that will inevitably result in a value-maximizing transaction. Many management teams deliver on these promises; in retrospect, however, at least as many seem to have parked their molecule in the front yard with a ‘For Sale’ sign and hoped for the best. While we can validate the importance of a molecular pathway, double-check market size predictions, run our own statistics and reality-check pricing assumptions, we have no way to identify talent in business development.”
Left at the Altar
One of the most important negative considerations for biotechnology companies looking to partner is that large pharmaceutical companies often shift resources and the focus of their pipeline development candidates over time, which may put their collaborators at risk. Although sometimes done for strategic reasons rather than due to new clinical insight, the sudden departure of a large pharmaceutical partner can reflect poorly on an otherwise promising product candidate.
For example, Celldex Therapeutics, Inc. (CLDX) announced in September 2010 that the company would regain full worldwide rights to develop and commercialize rindopepimut [CDX-110] from Pfizer, Inc. (PFE). The companies had entered into a global development and commercialization agreement in April 2008 for rindopepimut, an experimental therapeutic cancer vaccine that targets the tumor-specific molecule epidermal growth factor receptor variant III in patients with glioblastoma multiforme. Pfizer informed Celldex that the rindopepimut program was no longer a strategic priority of Pfizer and terminated the agreement despite the fact that the product candidate met or exceeded all pre-determined safety and efficacy objectives across three clinical studies. Shares of Celldex, which traded as high as $9.49 during 2010, reached a 52-week low of $2.91 on the news.
More recently, Transgene announced on February 22, 2011, that Roche Holding terminated its 2007 agreement under which Roche had been granted exclusive global development and commercialization rights to TG4001/RG3484, a therapeutic vaccine candidate currently in a 200 patient Phase IIb study to treat notably high grade cervical intraepithelial neoplasia [CIN] lesions [CIN2/3] caused by human papilloma virus [HPV] infection. While Transgene stated that Roche’s decision to terminate the license agreement was based on strategic reasons and wasn’t data driven, the company’s shares reached a 52-week low on the news.
Hopes and Dreams Versus Revenue Streams
Another potential negative is that by partnering a product candidate, the “hope and dream” multiple of a potential partnership or acquisition may be replaced by the realities of a “revenue stream,” such as milestone payments and future product royalties. By discounting the economics of a partnership deal for certain risk factors, investors can assign a net present value to the company that may be quite different than the speculative valuation in the absence of a partnership. Representing a unique opportunity to review the effect of partnering on market capitalization, three separate deals were announced for late-stage product candidates aimed at treating prostate cancer during 2009, while two companies have remained independent [see Table 2].
As the first transaction announced that year, Johnson & Johnson’s (JNJ) acquisition of Cougar Biotechnology for nearly $1 billion in cash in May 2009 initially looked attractive. However, following approval of Provenge® [sipuleucel-T] in April 2010, the market capitalization of Dendreon Corporation (DNDN) exceeded $7 billion, which demonstrates the potential benefit of remaining independent or retaining worldwide rights. In contrast, more than a year after partnering their late-stage programs, the market valuations of two other companies, Medivation, Inc. (MDVN) and OncoGenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (OGXI), are $605 million and $150 million, respectively.
Using Dendreon’s valuation as an example, it isn’t surprising that Bavarian Nordic A/S announced earlier today that the company is reviewing alternate options to maximize value for shareholders and fund the pivotal Phase 3 trial of its “off-the-shelf” therapeutic vaccine product candidate Prostvac® on its own. Keeping its options open, however, Bavarian Nordic is exploring opportunities to pursue independent development in parallel with continuing partnership discussions.
Table 2. Late-stage Prostate Cancer Programs
A Means to an End
The biggest argument against partnering is the fact that some of the most successful biotechnology companies to date are those that have commercialized their own products, such as Amgen, Inc. (AMGN), Celgene Corporation (CELG), and several others.
“Celgene is a unique example of success by taking a slightly different approach,” said Charles Duncan, managing director and senior biotech analyst at JMP Securities LLC. “The company built a pipeline and worldwide infrastructure for Revlimid® [lenalidomide] that was funded and supported through its early sales of Thalomid® [thalidomide].”
“We viewed partnering our lead product as a critical strategic decision that would shape the company and significantly impact our vision,” said Sol J. Barer, Ph.D., Executive Chairman of Celgene Corporation. “We felt that our pursuing the development of Revlimid worldwide alone was the best option consistent with our vision a of becoming a major global biopharmaceutical company over the next few years. We clearly recognized the short versus long term trade-offs in the decision; nevertheless, our belief in the product and in our ability to manage the product globally was important in our decision not to partner.”
Some companies have also partnered a specific program in certain geographies or disease settings and use the validation and resulting economics to help advance their own pipeline -- sometimes even in competitive areas. For example, Amgen originally developed Epogen® [epoetin alfa], which the company commercialized as a treatment for anemia in dialysis patients and partnered non-dialysis rights with Johnson & Johnson [sold as Procrit®]. Amgen later developed and commercialized Aranesp® [darbepoetin alfa], an erythropoiesis stimulating protein with a longer half-life and increased biologic activity that was not partnered.
Similarly, Oncothyreon, Inc. (ONTY) has granted a license to Merck KGaA of Darmstadt, Germany, for the clinical development, manufacturing, and marketing of Stimuvax®. Oncothyreon is eligible for cash payments based on the achievement of certain process transfer events, regulatory submissions in first and second cancer indications, regulatory approval for first and second cancer indications, and for sales milestones. Oncothyreon will also receive a royalty based on net sales. If successful in the clinic, Stimuvax could also help validate another Oncothyreon product candidate, ONT-10, which is a completely synthetic MUC1-based liposomal glycolipopeptide cancer vaccine that could compete with Stimuvax. Merck KGaA has a right of first negotiation with respect to ONT-10.
Traditional wisdom holds that biotechnology companies benefit from collaborations with their larger pharmaceutical peers, which can help validate a company’s technology, provide capital to help fund clinical development, and enable access to experienced clinical, regulatory and commercial infrastructure. While this was certainly true in the early days of biotechnology, the industry has now matured -- ushering in a new era whereby executives must carefully weigh the trade-offs between raising capital to go alone (equity dilution) and sharing economics with a partner (asset dilution). For a comparison between the old and new paradigms in biotechnology collaborations, refer to Table 1.
Table 1. Old Versus New Paradigm in Biotechnology Collaborations
In addition, the negative considerations from large pharmaceutical partnerships are often overlooked, which begs the question: Is it better to partner, or go alone? To help address the topic, this article focuses on the oncology segment of the life science industry -- one of the most popular therapeutic areas for partnering and merger & acquisition (M&A) activity.
Luck Versus Skill
Prior to addressing the question of whether or not a small biotechnology company should collaborate with a larger pharmaceutical organization, we solicited investor views regarding the process of corporate partnering. Some of the feedback indicates there is a lack of transparency.
“As an investor, partnering activity is the most opaque part of our companies’ business,” said David Sable, portfolio manager, Special Situations Life Sciences Fund. “Every small biotech CEO tries to create an image of limitless interest on the part of big pharma in each of the company’s projects, a dynamic that will inevitably result in a value-maximizing transaction. Many management teams deliver on these promises; in retrospect, however, at least as many seem to have parked their molecule in the front yard with a ‘For Sale’ sign and hoped for the best. While we can validate the importance of a molecular pathway, double-check market size predictions, run our own statistics and reality-check pricing assumptions, we have no way to identify talent in business development.”
Left at the Altar
One of the most important negative considerations for biotechnology companies looking to partner is that large pharmaceutical companies often shift resources and the focus of their pipeline development candidates over time, which may put their collaborators at risk. Although sometimes done for strategic reasons rather than due to new clinical insight, the sudden departure of a large pharmaceutical partner can reflect poorly on an otherwise promising product candidate.
For example, Celldex Therapeutics, Inc. (CLDX) announced in September 2010 that the company would regain full worldwide rights to develop and commercialize rindopepimut [CDX-110] from Pfizer, Inc. (PFE). The companies had entered into a global development and commercialization agreement in April 2008 for rindopepimut, an experimental therapeutic cancer vaccine that targets the tumor-specific molecule epidermal growth factor receptor variant III in patients with glioblastoma multiforme. Pfizer informed Celldex that the rindopepimut program was no longer a strategic priority of Pfizer and terminated the agreement despite the fact that the product candidate met or exceeded all pre-determined safety and efficacy objectives across three clinical studies. Shares of Celldex, which traded as high as $9.49 during 2010, reached a 52-week low of $2.91 on the news.
More recently, Transgene announced on February 22, 2011, that Roche Holding terminated its 2007 agreement under which Roche had been granted exclusive global development and commercialization rights to TG4001/RG3484, a therapeutic vaccine candidate currently in a 200 patient Phase IIb study to treat notably high grade cervical intraepithelial neoplasia [CIN] lesions [CIN2/3] caused by human papilloma virus [HPV] infection. While Transgene stated that Roche’s decision to terminate the license agreement was based on strategic reasons and wasn’t data driven, the company’s shares reached a 52-week low on the news.
Hopes and Dreams Versus Revenue Streams
Another potential negative is that by partnering a product candidate, the “hope and dream” multiple of a potential partnership or acquisition may be replaced by the realities of a “revenue stream,” such as milestone payments and future product royalties. By discounting the economics of a partnership deal for certain risk factors, investors can assign a net present value to the company that may be quite different than the speculative valuation in the absence of a partnership. Representing a unique opportunity to review the effect of partnering on market capitalization, three separate deals were announced for late-stage product candidates aimed at treating prostate cancer during 2009, while two companies have remained independent [see Table 2].
As the first transaction announced that year, Johnson & Johnson’s (JNJ) acquisition of Cougar Biotechnology for nearly $1 billion in cash in May 2009 initially looked attractive. However, following approval of Provenge® [sipuleucel-T] in April 2010, the market capitalization of Dendreon Corporation (DNDN) exceeded $7 billion, which demonstrates the potential benefit of remaining independent or retaining worldwide rights. In contrast, more than a year after partnering their late-stage programs, the market valuations of two other companies, Medivation, Inc. (MDVN) and OncoGenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (OGXI), are $605 million and $150 million, respectively.
Using Dendreon’s valuation as an example, it isn’t surprising that Bavarian Nordic A/S announced earlier today that the company is reviewing alternate options to maximize value for shareholders and fund the pivotal Phase 3 trial of its “off-the-shelf” therapeutic vaccine product candidate Prostvac® on its own. Keeping its options open, however, Bavarian Nordic is exploring opportunities to pursue independent development in parallel with continuing partnership discussions.
Table 2. Late-stage Prostate Cancer Programs
A Means to an End
The biggest argument against partnering is the fact that some of the most successful biotechnology companies to date are those that have commercialized their own products, such as Amgen, Inc. (AMGN), Celgene Corporation (CELG), and several others.
“Celgene is a unique example of success by taking a slightly different approach,” said Charles Duncan, managing director and senior biotech analyst at JMP Securities LLC. “The company built a pipeline and worldwide infrastructure for Revlimid® [lenalidomide] that was funded and supported through its early sales of Thalomid® [thalidomide].”
“We viewed partnering our lead product as a critical strategic decision that would shape the company and significantly impact our vision,” said Sol J. Barer, Ph.D., Executive Chairman of Celgene Corporation. “We felt that our pursuing the development of Revlimid worldwide alone was the best option consistent with our vision a of becoming a major global biopharmaceutical company over the next few years. We clearly recognized the short versus long term trade-offs in the decision; nevertheless, our belief in the product and in our ability to manage the product globally was important in our decision not to partner.”
Some companies have also partnered a specific program in certain geographies or disease settings and use the validation and resulting economics to help advance their own pipeline -- sometimes even in competitive areas. For example, Amgen originally developed Epogen® [epoetin alfa], which the company commercialized as a treatment for anemia in dialysis patients and partnered non-dialysis rights with Johnson & Johnson [sold as Procrit®]. Amgen later developed and commercialized Aranesp® [darbepoetin alfa], an erythropoiesis stimulating protein with a longer half-life and increased biologic activity that was not partnered.
Similarly, Oncothyreon, Inc. (ONTY) has granted a license to Merck KGaA of Darmstadt, Germany, for the clinical development, manufacturing, and marketing of Stimuvax®. Oncothyreon is eligible for cash payments based on the achievement of certain process transfer events, regulatory submissions in first and second cancer indications, regulatory approval for first and second cancer indications, and for sales milestones. Oncothyreon will also receive a royalty based on net sales. If successful in the clinic, Stimuvax could also help validate another Oncothyreon product candidate, ONT-10, which is a completely synthetic MUC1-based liposomal glycolipopeptide cancer vaccine that could compete with Stimuvax. Merck KGaA has a right of first negotiation with respect to ONT-10.
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